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A.

TABLE OF AUTHORITY
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Holm v. Smilowitz

840 P.2nd 159 [Utah App. 1992]
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B.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to UTAH JUDICIAL CODE: Pages 399-401

[78-3-13.5]

Counties joining the court system,

[78-3-4]

Jurisdiction
(4) "Appeals from the final orders, judgements, and

decrees of the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a3.
See also [78-2-2(1)].
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

c.

The Appellant requests the Court of Appeals consider the
following issues:

a.
1.

Equity in the law.

Pursuant to the 1964 Discrimination Act; passed by congress

with a provision that no discrimination in terms of gender, or sex
can exist in any walk of life, in jobs, in promotions, even in the
attendance of private clubs. The lower Court has violated this
provision of the law by granting to the Appellee (the female) during
the interim, and in it's final decrees, all of the meaning parts of
the estate in question and all of the estate labeled "inheritance".
The lower Court also concluded the gifts and stolen money from the
estate that were "inheritance" on the here say of counsel(female).
Then the Court garnished the wages of the Appellant(male) and
refused the Appellant a hearing to collect the money owed to him by
the female. The Court refused a hearing to pursue the question of
coercion and refused to acknowledge the illness and economic rape
of the male.
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2*

It is therefore just and proper that this matter be set for

trial and the instruction to the lower Court should be to divide in
the estate in half according to the law passed by congress in 1964,
and the laws of Utah, and to order that an accountant to set the
value of "half11 as the Appellee has very serious problems with that
fraction.
3.

If the Court of Appeals rules, and grants that the female

ought to have the bulk of the estate, and the estate labeled
"inheritance" then, it would be just that each party have an equal
retirement income. The Court should order that each party shall
have his or her retirement and to rescind the QUALIFIED DOMESTIC
ORDER. The Court may also order that the equity in the fourplex($70,000) by granted to Appellant to compensate the loss of
half of his retirement, about $70,000.
b.

The theft of assets via the instructions given the

Appellee by her counsel.
1.

The Appellant requests that all bank accounts jointly owned or

individually owened in the name of the Appellant or the of the
Appellee be divided in half, and that an accountant be set by the
Court and ordered to effect this division on the day of the divorce
Oct. 10 1992.
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c.
1.

The issue of the estate and it's value and extent.

The Appellant requests that the value of all assets as of Oct.

10 1992 of the Appellant and the Appellee be appraised by the
accounting firm, operated by Sidney Gilbert(a previosly mutually
accepted accountant) for the purpose of the equal division of the
said property and that the costs of this appraisal are to be
equally divided.

d.
1.

The issue of fraud on the part of counsel by coercion.

At the time the divorce was filed the attorney, Ms. Brown, was

informed that the Appellant was under extreme coercion and did not
feel he was able to make a proper decision at that time. Instead of
delaying the matter and refusing to proceed she fabricated false
information and had the Appellant sign this to cover her backside.
This was a criminal act to take advantage of the Appellant in his
known state of mind. The Appellant requests the Court to order Ms.
Brown, counsel for the Appellee, to return her attorney fees to the
estate (half to the Appellee and half to the Appellant).
e.

The issue of relief for the lower courts failure to grant

a hearing.
1.

The Appellant requests the court to grant that all of the

money collected from the voice-mail and pager leases by the "bait
and switch11 fraud perpetrated by Ms. Brown be returned to the
Appellant. That is; all of the money in his name from Oct. 10, 1992
to the present ($195 + $350)/ month and that the $925 of attorneys
fees to collect this be granted the Appellant as well. The
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Appellant also requests that Ms. Brown be ordered by the Court to
clear the Appellants name of the debt on the home granted to the
Appellee, and to file a law suit free of charge, or whatever it
takes to free the Appellant of this credit problem. It is also
further requested that the Court order the Success Tax firm of
Provo, the firm that has completed the tax forms for the estate for
years, determine the value of the tax deduction of the interest
paid on the home and award that tax deduction to the Appellant.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

D,

The Constitution of the United States of America provides the
following rights:
a* The right to a speedy trial.
b. The right to have counsel,
c. The right to a hearing.
d. The right to appeal.
e. The right to equity in the law.
f. The right to own property.
The provision by the 1964 Sex Disrimination Act to eliminate
gender bias in all parts of society is very germain to this case.
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E.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Comes now, the Appellant's Statement Of The Case in Brief•

1.

The Court hearing this matter was in the mind set that; all

men seeking a divorce have left there spouse destitute, that they
have taken every liquid asset of the estate and are before the
court to be taught the lesson that male roll is to provide. The
Court has dealt with many such cases and the mechanism for
confiscation of the male's estate and income were all primed to be
put in place. The extreme gender bias of the court from past
experience is the main cause of this appeal. Because of this bias
the court was unable and unwilling to consider the needs of the
male in this action.
2.

The Court's position seemed to be if the male filed then he

should loose his lives work and the female should have his estate.
The roving eye of the male appears to the Court to dictate this
policy. It never occurred to the Court that the male was leaving
because the female had another she loved, and that the cause of
this action is the hate, the greed and the defiance by the female.
It is always assumed that there is no reason that a man should ever
leave a woman only the reverse.
3.

The thought that a professional person could come to the court

with good cause for divorce, and that the natural provider had
already provided for every need of the female was not
comprehendible to this Court. Nor did the Court at any time
consider that the female might have an estate of her own, that she
10

needed no providing for, and that as a result of this extensive
estate, had no need of any of the joint estate income nor the wages
of the male to defend herself, nor to provide for herself during
the needless-elongated proceedings of this matter* Commissioner
Maetani consistently denied the Appellant the opportunity to
explain this or any other matter. It was all as water off a ducks
back when the Court was forced to give the Appellant audience.
The Court had it's mind set as concrete; all mixed up and
very permanently set. Rubber stamping everything presented to the
court by the female lawyer is much simpler than listening and
getting at the truth by asking pointed questions. The greater the
backlog of cases the greater the use of the rubber stamp.
4.

Consider the Appellee's own estate. She had over $88/month in

low interest income and $150/month from the sale of some property
and more than $30,000 in several secret bank accounts. If she had
continued to work, only a few hours per month these incomes would
have sustained her living without touching her savings. At the time
of the separation she was paying no mortgage and had worked up
until she received orders from her attorney not work until the
divorce was final, so as to play out the lie of the unskilled
housewife with no assets. Her only expense was utilities, food and
travel for one person. The greatest joy in her life, during the 32
year marriage, was to squirrel away several hundred dollars a month
in her secret accounts. The Appellee paid for nothing from her
income as per the instructions from her brother, who runs her life,
at considerable cost to her. She paid for no food, no clothing for
11

herself, no family vacations only her separate vacations, no
emergency, no expense of any kind was paid from her estate. To rub
salt into the sore spot she paid her tithing from the wages of the
Appellant. So to make sure she had plenty of money to squirrel away
the Appellant assigned to her the income from an pager/voice male
lease which was very close to $1,000/ month without any input from
the Court. She also had an additional $400/ month income from the
"jointly" owned four-plex. This provision was 88 + 150 + 195 + 92.5
+ 700 + 400 or $1,625.50 / month non-working income. Without a
mortgage payment this left her at least $800/month to squirrel
away. At this point the take home pay of the Appellant was $1,800
/ month in wages. She was also provided with the best
transportation all paid for, to tote this money to her secret
accounts. In addition to that she was provided with access to a
joint account with over $6,000 in it. The Appellant's plan was to
pay any unpaid bills and obtain counsel, and split the rest. The
Appellee's plan was to take everything of value and she did. She
stole his skis and boots, wheels for his truck, a motor he had
overhauled, his rototiller and many other personal items were
taken, if not for money, then for spite as well as bank accounts.
5.

Had the Court recognized the theft of this money and the other

items, that alone would have justified deigning alimony. If she had
$6,000 from a joint account she certainly did not need alimony
during the litigation. Commissioner Maetani in granting alimony has
set a new record in the Courts. For the Commissioner to say that a
fair trial could follow with the Appellant having to work and live
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on $900/month with no access to savings and the Appellee to sit
home and have $2,525.50/month and have access to all of her vast
estate of stolen money, shows the extreme gender bias of the Court*
For one professional teacher to pay another professional teacher
alimony under these conditions without children involved, has to be
a first in gender bias. Utah has always been behind in adjusting to
the trends. Some states have very wisely outlawed alimony with
women making up 47 % of the work force, alimony is a gender biased
law. It is just and proper that this Court of Appeals consider the
return of these unjustified payments ($4,042) and the return of the
Appellants half of the joint accounts($3,000).
6.

The Appellee has made good use of her idle time calling and

visiting the children and friends and carefully portraying the
Appellant as a the worst person on the face of this earth. She was
successful in her slander in some cases since there are members of
Appellant's family that refuse a written invitation to attend the
home of the Appellant. She went to the campus where the Appellant
works and interfered with work, and tried to get his friends
to end their friendship by the use of slander. She called the
Bishop of the LDS Church and was able to convince him that the
Appellant should not have a temple recommend and the Bishop
followed her orders and withdrew that recommend. The day before the
Appellant was to marry in the temple she called the temple and got
them to cancel the marriage via her slander. She has openly stated
her goal in life is to have the Appellant live out his life without
one person to care if he lives or dies and for him to do it in
abject poverty.
13

7.

To facilitate the goal to have the Appellant die in poverty

the Appellee secured theroostexpensive counsel with the very best
in delay tactics. This woman is totally incapable of telling the
truth and is also an excellent con artist. This woman was judge,
jury and counsel for both parties. She would stand up in court and
outline what the matter was, and her interpretation of the law
concerning it, and what the Court aught to do and say concerning
the matter, and demand that the court grant her request. At that
point the parties might as well have left the court. She had
consulted with the Commissioner prior to coming to court and they
had set what was to happen. Everything was cut and dried in
conspiracy long before court was held.
8.

She devised a temporary document that gave her client total

control over all of the assets of the marriage and one that granted
her client an additional $900/raonth from the salary of the
Appellant. Any extended period would have left the Appellant unable
to defend himself in court, so the Appellant wouldn't sign until
she promised that this would be in effect for one month only, and
that the matter was set for trial with the appropriate waiver. She
maintained, if the Appellant wanted a speedy divorce he would have
to sign, and that this must be signed right now since court was
about to quit for the day, and that there would be weeks of delay
if the Appellant didn't sign right now, and that this action was
just the court's normal procedure. At this time the Appellant
didn't know the true character of this con artist. The truth of the
matter is; that once property has been assigned to a female via a
14

female lawyer the male has no chance of ever regaining that
property in Commissioner Maetani's Court.
9.

The Appellant's counsel was involved as a public defender and

was unprepared to counsel or defend the Appellant and told him so,
at the time. However, she said to go ahead and sign it and she
promised to go to trial better prepared. Counsel confirmed that at
the trial a complete accounting of the estate would be made and
that since she had filed a waiver and set the matter for trial and
that the trial was only a few weeks away and at that time according
to the law the total assets of the marriage would be divided in
half, including all of the income from the investments and the real
estate. The truth was that neither counsel had set the matter for
trial nor did they ever have any intention of setting this matter
for trial. This was a ripe plumb ready to be plucked, and they were
not about to let this one get away. The Appellant's counsel was
female and by her gender wanted the female to get the estate. They
wanted this before the courts as many years as possible and they
were very successful. This matter was started in March of 1992 and
is now one year and a half old and we are no closer to a
satisfactory settlement now than we were in March of 1992.
10.

A non-appealable-satisfactory settlement to both parties of

this matter is obtained by following the guild lines given in the
law. If both parties were to come to the Court or an arbitrator
with a list of the assets of the marriage in descending order of
value(the most valuable first) with an indication of those items
each party would like to have, the divorce would be very simple in
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the law. Both parties must agree as to the value of the items or
this would be resolved by an appraisal that each pays half to
obtain. The woman would be granted first choice since women are
highly favored by the courts. If one party did not indicate the he
or she wanted that item, then that choice would be voided by the
failure to act. Any liquid asset would then serve to set an exact
half to each according to the guild lines of the law. The Appellant
set an appointment with a mutual friend, an accountant to act as an
arbitrator. The Appellee failed to make that appointment. She much
preferred to litigate than to arbitrate. With her counsel in total
control it would be foolish for her to arbitrate. Why take half
according to the law when you can get it all by coercion and fraud?
11.

Next the con artist had her client empty the joint accounts

and the set a date whereby only the empty accounts and the Key bank
account, in the Appellants name, were to be frozen. All of her
clients accounts with the stolen money in them, were to be left
open and labeled as "inheritance money". This left the Appellee
with a $2,000/month to squirrel away for seven months and is now
living on this $14,000 of stolen money, plus the money stolen from
the leases after the divorce.
12.

The problem with most thefts is there are usually many

mistakes. Somehow the conspiracy failed and the Appellee was
closing out accounts after the date set by the con artist and
Commissioner Maetani. At this point Judge Park signed an Order to
Show Cause and the matter was set for hearing. Bank statements were
presented to the Court showing the closing of "frozen" accounts.
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This proved an embarrassment but Commissioner Maetani told the con
artist that, he expected the her to respect the frozen nature of
these accounts and that was the end of the matter. In other words
a slap on the wrist(naughty girl) for grand theft if your a well
liked female lawyer in his court*
13.

After a few months of delay, the Appellant was unable to keep

up with the $2,000/month scam and his wages were garnisheed. At
this point the Appellant asked the Court for a divorce and a trial
for a property settlement later. The Appellant and the Appellee
both wanted this to take place only the con artist and the Court
wanted this not to occur. A trial may be appealed but if a
signature is obtained, then it is almost impossible to appeal, as
indicated to the Appellant, by Frederick Jackman who refused to
take this case because the chance of winning was small according to
Jackman. The granting of this divorce at this time was a very
necessary relief to the emotionally charged battle of the past
months. Not to grant this on the basis that to do so would relieve
the coercion was clearly malfeasance of office on the part of the
court. The Courts main function is to serve, and to grant relief
from oppression not to foster and sustain oppression and cruel and
unusual punishment. We pay taxes for the judges to relieve not to
coerce. In the Courts own words to grant such a request would
remove the "incentive to settle". This brings the court to the
conclusion that extended delays foster fewer successful appeals,
which is great for the court, but denies the basic constitutional
right to a speedy trial to the parties.
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14.

As a result of the weakened physical condition and the

needless-prolonged-camping-out living conditions imposed by the
Court on the Appellant, the Appellant contracted tick fever, a
debilitating disease that attaches the liver. The Appellant
determined that it was best to sign anything and get this matter
before a court of law, rather than this three ring circus that
wasn't funny or entertaining. It was clear that the conspiracy to
break the male to a point where he would sign anything had been
very successful.
15.

When the con artist learned that the Appellant was ill and was

signing anything, she didn't keep up with the concessions. This is
why the divorce indicates that each party shall pay their own court
costs in one place, and in another grants the con artist $1,000.
This is also why in one place it indicates that the Appellee shall
pay all of the debts on the home granted to her and in another that
the Appellants savings shall be used for that.
16.

Since the Appellee had been very successful in hiding her

estate from the Court by calling it "inherited" money and since the
Court accepted the here say of Ms. Brown, and since playacting the
part of the poor unskilled housewife had been done so well the
Appellant demanded that the pager-voice-mail leases having his name
on them were to be his from October 1992 until they ran out. This
amounts to half of the voice-mail lease or $350 and $195(his pager
lease) each month from the month of October of 1992 until the lease
ran out. The Appellee was to have $350(her half) and $97.5(her
pager lease). The con artist running true to form, made up a number
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$395(there is no lease with this nuinber on it and she has copies of
all leases and they are filed with the court) and used that plus
the $195(his pager lease) and wrote into the divorce these two
should be split and failed to mention the $97.5(her pager lease)
completely. This is the con artists bait and switch technique. The
parties agree to something verbally she writes something up that
sounds like the verbal agreement but grants to her client the bulk
of the amount. If the opponent is trusting and signs, all she has
to do is claim that this wasn't the case and the signed agreement
stands up in any court. This was very acceptable procedure in
Commissioner Maetani's court. This wasn't the end she then
instructed her client not to pay anything. The plan was to take the
matter before Commissioner Maetani and with her total control have
even this granted to the Appellee as well. The Appellant filed a
motion to have the payment of these funds confiscated from the
Appellee's vast bank accounts and was refused a hearing to do so.
The Appellant then secured the services of Frederick Jackman and
spent $925 in fees and has no way of recovering those fees, accept
through this Court, since the Commissioner refuses to hear the
matter.
17.

When the con artist was told by the Appellant he was being

coerced, she then put a statement in the Stipulation that no such
coercion was taking place, since she knew it would be signed. This
statement was there to cover her back side. She also added one more
statement she knew was not true, that was that the Appellant had
consulted an attorney before signing her lies.
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18.

Commissioner Maetani knew this economic rape was a result of

coercion. He was and is today a party to that coercion. So he
arranged a swearing in, a statement to cover his back side. His
thinking was that no court would hear an appeal where the male had
stated that the divorce was fair. The Appellant knew there was no
way the divorce would be signed, there was no way to get matter
before a legitimate court, unless he said it was fair. Had the
Appellant told the commissioner the things contained in this appeal
the matter would gone back to the delay mode. If the Appellant
wanted a divorce in this century, it was mandatory to secure the
Commissioner's backside.
19.

At this point the economic rape was complete except for one

item. The con artist was to use the Appellant's savings to pay the
back payments, in the month of October, on the home granted to the
Appellee. A few days before the divorce the Appellant gave the con
artist $14,000 from his savings. However being an excellent con
artist she delayed making the settlement with the Lomas Mortgage
until the beginning of 1993. This delay of several months enabled
the con artist's client to have the interest deduction of $3,500.
In addition she arranged to have the Appellant's name on the
mortgage so that he is unable to get credit since the credit report
shows his home, his truck, and the home granted to the Appellee all
as his debt as by the fraudulent divorce. It is proper and just
that the Appellee pay the Appellant this tax deduction obtained by
fraud, and pay the cost of removing the name of the Appellant from
the mortgage on the home granted to the Appellee by the fraudulent
divorce.
20

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

F,

The summary of the Argument is as follows;

That:
a* Commissioner Maetani has failed to grant the Appellant
his constitutional right to a hearing on critical issues*
b. There is a case of president cited in the Motion
For Summary Disposition, where the Court Of Appeals has reversed
the lower Courts decision for failure to grant the fundamental
right to a hearing.
c. The signature of the Appellant effecting this
economic rape, was obtained under the condition of ill health, and
by economic and verbal coercion.
d. The estate of the couple was never declared to
the courts in any form.
e. The assets of the Appellee should be declared by
this Court Of Appeals, as joint property since no legal evidence
was or is now presented to the contrary.
f. That the disparity of the division of property clearly
shows the gender bias of the Court. The Court was approached
several times to end this economic rape, but failed to consider the
needs of the male because of it's extreme gender bias.
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G.

ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
The Argument of this case is as follows;

That:
a.

Because of the gender bias of the Court and the personal

affinity for the counsel of the Appellee the Court failed, to hear
the Appellant's case concerning his following needs;
1.

The need for reasonable living conditions.

2.

The need to reconsider the interim document.

3.

The need to grant the Appellant access to funds for

appropriate counsel.
4.

The need to consider the health and ability to make

critical decisions without counsel.
5.

The need to be able to collect money owed to the

Appellant by the Appellee according to the fraudulent divorce.
6.

The need to protect the credit rating and the

ability to function in society.
b.

In the case of Holm v. Smilowitz the decision of the

lower Court was reversed since the Commissioner involved did not
grant a hearing and acted on here say. This is exactly the mode of
operation of Commissioner Maetani in this matter.
c.

In spite of repeated attempts on the part of the

Appellant the Court refused to allow the Appellant to live in his
own apartment. As a result of the coercion and bad living
conditions, the Appellant became ill and despondent to the point
that he signed any document, and said anything, to get this matter
before a legitimate court.
22

d.

The fact that the Court signed a document with self

contradictions granting the Appellee the Appellant's half of the
estate, shows the rubber stamping nature of the Court. It also
shows the Court is not interested in a just decision, only in a
decision that is hard to appeal. The Court required no appraisal of
real estate or bank account balance of the Appellee, be set in
the Stipulation nor the divorce. The fact that there could have
been $1,000,000 in any of the accounts granted under this Courts
adjudication shows the complete disregard for the welfare of the
male by this Court of bias.
e.

The Court erred in not requiring the Appellee to prove

the money held in her estate was "inherited". To accept carte blank
the here say evidence of her counsel over the objections of the
Appellant was very biased procedure. Every penny of the Appellant's
account and his wages and his retirement and any other item of
value was sought out like a bear seeking honey, and declared before
the Court in full.
f.

The four-plex in question will become a very good

retirement income. When the refinancing is complete and the
mortgage is paid off, the income will continue to rise with
inflation. The Appellee would have under the fraudulent divorce
her Social Security, her retirement from teaching, and half of the
Appellants retirement and the income from the four-plex at the
point where the mortgage is all paid off.(about $20,000/year at
retirement). Why should the female have all of the meaningful
assets of this estate? Why should every manner of coercion and
23

fraud be rewarded in this disproportionate manner? It is very
unfair for the female to have the home, the four-plex, the pagervoice-mail leases, the bank accounts and the male to have some
minor investments. It is very unfair for the female to have her
retirement and half of that of the Appellant. It is fair that the
valuable items of the estate be divided equally according to the
law and equity. The male can not recover from this inequity in the
few remaining years he has to work. The courts must not let the
politics of the day obscure the needs of the male in retirement.

24

H.

CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this matter is when men are given

power, it is their nature and disposition to abuse that power. To
render decisions based on who is involved, and completely ignore
needs of the parties or any of the facts of the case. This has been
repeated over and over again in history. The reason we have a
constitution holding sacred certain rights, such as a speedy trial
and the right to a jury trial, and the right to a hearing is; that
the English had based their decisions on the class of the citizen
and not on the facts. The violation of these rights gave birth to
civil rights. Frederick Jackman has said; "there is no law in
divorce court1*. He is such a successful lawyer that he has a
building named after him, and takes only the cases he is certain of
winning.
Compare the divorce of Mantz v. Mantz with this case.
Two teachers the same age of the parties of this litigation, and
having the same estate, a car, a truck, two houses and investments
and bank accounts. The judge told the parties on the opening day
that there would be no alimony since both were college graduates.
The estate was split in half and in forty five days and the healing
process had already begun. The total cost was $750. The legal costs
of this case are now about a factor of ten higher than Mantz v.
Mantz. There can be no healing in a divorce that goes on for years
and years, there is only complete polarization in the extended
family. If reasonal a judication is in one city and economic rape in
an other, then Mr. Jackman is right, there is no law in divorce
court.
25

I.

MANUAL SIGNATURE

This is to certify that without the help of an attorney I
Robert H. Peterson, the Appellant, did prepare this document to the
very best of my limited ability, I would have much prefered to
teach Calculus, Physics and Electronics and to have had an attorney
prepare this document. I did seek earnestly to submit this document
free of error, with the help of an attorney. No attorney that
reviewed the case would take this case.
Dated this the 23rd day of October 1993.

ROBERT H. PETERSON
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE

J.

I ROBERT H. PETERSON

certify that on

D&M1492

I served two copies of the attached brief upon Michael D. Esplin of
43 East 200 North Provo, Utah counsel, for the Appellee, in this
natter by personally serving it upon him at the the following
address.
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601

Dated this day the

%

&

of October 1993.

.
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Robert H. Peterson
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BRIEF
Addendum
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Virginia T. Peterson
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Michael D. Esplin
Attorney for Appellee
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Tel. (801) 373-4912

Court of Appeals
Case # 930437-CA

Robert H. Peterson
Appellant (pro-se)
1373 East 400 South
Springville, Ut. 84663
Tel. (801) 489-4790

FILED
OCT 2 7 1993

COURT OF APPEALS

Marilyn Moody Brown #4803
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN
Attorneys for Defendant
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,
Defendant.
Civil No. 924400839
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 8th day of October, 1992, Commissioner Howard H.
Maetani presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and was

representing himself. The Defendant did not appear in person
but was represented by MARILYN MOODY BROWN of Robinson,
Seiler, Glazier and Brown.

The Court having heard the

testimony introduced on behalf of the Plaintiff and being
fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions, now upon motion of
Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract

heretofore existing by and between the Plaintiff and Defendant
be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the Plaintiff is
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to become
absolute and final upon entry by the Court in the Register of
Actions.
2.

Plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Utah County,

State of Utah, and has been for three months immediately prior
to the filing of this action.
3.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 23,

1959, at St. George, Utah, and are presently married.
4.

There have been five children born as issue of this

marriage.

All of said children have reached the age of

majority.
5.

Each party waives and forever relinquishes any and

all claims he or she may have to alimony from the other party
or to any share of the assets of other party, except as herein
expressly provided.
6.

Defendant is awarded the right, title, and interest

in and to the real property located at 4 37 South 800 East,
Orem, Utah, and the four-plex located at 789 East 1400 South,
Orem, Utah.

Defendant hereby accepts and assumes exclusive

responsibility for any and all debts and obligations arising
2

out of the purchase and ownership of said real property.
Plaintiff will execute a Quit Claim Deed transferring all his
right, title, and interest in and to said real property to
Defendant.
7.

The

obligations

owing

on

the

home

for

which

Defendant will be responsible will include the amount owing
to Sid Gilbert, Lomas and Nettleton (mortgage), Mardell Topham
(appraiser), and D. David Lambert (attorney).
8.

The Defendant

is awarded the Key Bank Account

(749072179) and will pay the following obligations from the
money in that account: Sid Gilbert ($300.00), Mardell Topham
($650.00), David Lambert

($1,000.00), Marilyn Moody Brown

($1,000.00), and Lomas and Nettleton.

Any amount in the

account in excess of the obligations named in this paragraph
shall be given to Plaintiff.
9.

The parties

acquired

personal

property.

Said

personal property is divided as follows:
A.
small

To the Plaintiff: 1982 truck, 1980 motorcycle,

motorcycle,

dune

buggy,

violin,

keyboard,

travel

trailer, and tools.
B.

To the Defendant:

1983 car, 6 foot by 12 foot

utility trailer, two inflatable boats, tools (pipe bender),
lawnmower, rototiller, antique dinette set, tv, VCR, couch,
3

two recliners, piano, sewing machine, 4 beds, washer and
dryer, bedroom set, food storage, freezer, computer, two
desks, filing cabinets, and microwave oven.
C.

The remaining personal property is awarded as

it has already been divided between the parties.
10.

The Plaintiff acquired a retirement and/or a pension

plan through his place of employment.

The Defendant will

receive one-half (1/2) of all amounts that were accumulated
during the marriage.

The- Court will enter a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order effectuating this provision.
11.

The Defendant will receive the home and the Key Bank

Account as indicated previously in this document in lieu of
any alimony.
12.

The parties have the following investments which

include tax shelter at Boston Inc., Fidelity Account, Dean
Witter Account, and Copeland IRA.

All of said investment is

awarded to the Plaintiff as his sole and exclusive property.
13.

The parties have a voice mail system investment

together with

leases.

The Defendant

inheritance from her father's estate.

received money as
With that money she

purchased a voice mail system. She is awarded this investment
as her sole and exclusive property.

The parties acquired a

voice mail investment which now has a lease agreement.
4

The

parties receive $395.00 and $195.00 per month from these
leases.

Commencing October 1, 1992, these amounts will be

equally divided until the lease expires.

Any assets in the

voice mail system are awarded to the Defendant.
14.

The Defendant acquired an account at Zion's Bank and

Universal Campus Credit Union from her father's estate. Said
property is awarded to her as her inheritance, free from any
interest from the Defendant.
15.

The Mountain America Credit Union Account will be

awarded to the Defendant.
16.

Any and all other bank accounts are awarded to the

parties as they are presently divided.
17.

The Plaintiff has been determined by the Court to

be in arrears on his alimony during the temporary period and
judgment has been entered against him.

All of said amounts

are considered satisfied. The Defendant's attorney will cause
a satisfaction of judgment and release of garnishment to be
sent to Plaintiff's employment and will release the amount
currently in garnishment.
18.

Any amounts received by Defendant for rents or

leases during the pendency of the divorce action are awarded
to her as her property.
19.

Any and all other debts and obligations will be paid
5

by the party who incurred the particular debt or obligation.
20.

Each party is ordered to pay his or her own state

and federal income taxes for the year 1992.
21.

The Plaintiff will immediately transfer the account

at Key Bank and sign Quit Claim Deeds conveying the property
above-stated to the Defendant on the date the stipulation is
signed then the divorce can be finalized immediately.
22.

Each party is ordered to assume his or her own costs

and attorney's fees incurred in this action.
23.
other

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the

such

documents

as

are

required

to

implement

provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
DATED this 8th day of October, 1992.
BY THE^OURT

w"^^

//

'HOWARD H. H2CETANI
Court Commissioner

the

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
********

ROBERT H. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

RULING
CIVIL NUMBER:

vs.

924400839

DECEMBER 7, 1992
COMMISSIONER MAETANI

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,
Defendant.
********

The above-entitled matter came before the court commissioner
for a default divorce on October 8, 1992 during which plaintiff was
present and appeared pro se.

The parties had entered into a

Stipulation which was filed with the Court on October 9, 1992. The
Decree Of Divorce and Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law were
signed and entered on October 9, 1992.

On or about October 13,

1992 defendant filed a Release Of Garnishment and on October 15,
1992 defendant also filed a Notice Of Entry Of Judgement.

On or

about November 19, 1992 plaintiff filed a Motion For A Change Of
Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A Hearing.
On or about November 20, 1992 defendant filed a Response To Motion
For Change Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request
For A Hearing.
The court upon review of the documentation and the Court's
tape record of the October 8, 1992 hearing and upon being advised
in the premises, now recommends as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the plaintiff filed a Complaint For Divorce in the

above-entitled matter on or about April 24, 1992. Defendant filed
an Answer To Complaint For Divorce And Counterclaim or about April
24, 1992.
After much litigation over the temporary orders in effect
during the pendency of this action, the parties entered into a
Stipulation which was filed with the Court October 9, 1992.

The

Stipulation addressed the issues of alimony, division of real and
personal

property,

and

division

of

investments,

retirement

benefits, and marital debts. The parties stipulated specifically
as the following issues: that the divorce would be granted on
grounds of

irreconcilable differences, that each party would

relinquish alimony, that defendant would be awarded the real
properties at 437 South 800 East, Orem and 789 East 1400 South,
Or em, that defendant would be awarded the Key Bank account and
would be responsible for the debts to Sid Gilbert, Lomas and
Nettleton, Mardell Topham, and David Lambert, that defendant would
be awarded one-half (%) of plaintiff's retirement or pension plan
that were accumulated during the parties' marriage, that the
investments with Boston, Inc., Fidelity Account, Dean Witter
Account, and Copeland IRA would be awarded to plaintiff, that
defendant would be awarded the voice mail system investment as her
sole property and that proceeds from the voice mail investment with
the lease agreement be divided equally until the expiration of the
lease, that defendant be awarded the bank accounts at Zion's Bank,

Universal Campus Credit Union, and Mountain America Credit Union,
that

defendant

would

enter

a satisfaction

of

judgement for

plaintiff's arrearages in temporary alimony, and that plaintiff
would transfer the bank account at Key Bank and sign quit Claim
deeds conveying the real property to defendant.

(See Stipulation

signed by parties on October 7, 1992 and filed with the Court on
October 9, 1992).
The Decree Of Divorce Of Divorce and Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law which incorporated the terms of the Stipulation
were prepared by defendant's counsel, Marilyn Moody Brown, and
signed and entered by the Court on October 9, 1992.

2.

That plaintiff filed his Motion For A Change Of Venue And

A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A Hearing on or about
November 19, 1992 alleging that his signature on all divorce
documents setting up the conditions of the divorce were obtained by
lies, fraud, coercion and financial hardship.

Plaintiff further

alleges that the Court is biased by individuals appearing pro se
and such bias constitutes coercion against the plaintiff and that
the Court has violated the law by granting defendant total control
over all the marital assets.
The Court notes that plaintiff signed his Motion For a Change
Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A
Hearing on October 7, 1992, the very same day that plaintiff signed
the Stipulation between the parties governing the settlement of the
disputed issues in this matter.

3.

Defendant alleges in her Response To Motion For A Change

Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A
Hearing that plaintiff's allegations that the Court has somehow
acted improperly are no different from the allegations plaintiff
has made throughout the pendency of this matter. Defendant further
points out that the Stipulation the parties entered into contained
very specific provisions as to plaintiff acknowledging that he has
obtained legal advice, that he has the right not to enter into the
Stipulation, and that he is entering into the agreement of his own
free will and is not action under the coercion or undue influence
of anyone. See Paragraphs 25. through 32. of the Stipulation filed
October 9, 1992.
4.

Under Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (1990), the Utah

Court of Appeals has held that stipulations are conclusive and
binding unless on timely notice and for good cause, relief is
granted.

See also Hialey v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984).

While contract theories such as bargain and waiver are inapplicable
to the court's continuing jurisdiction over child custody and
support, Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990), the Court
finds that plaintiff freely bargained for and accented to the
agreements entered into when the parties signed the Stipulation on
October 7, 1992.
The Court feels that plaintiff has produced insufficient proof
to support his allegations that he was under such coercion or
duress from either the defendant or the Court that he did not
assert his rights at the time he entered into the Stipulation. The
Court further notes that upon review of the Court's tape record of

the default proceedings

on October

8, 1992, that the Court

questioned plaintiff as to his understanding of the Stipulation
that parties had entered into and as to his agreement to be bound
by such agreement. The Court notes that plaintiff assented to both
his understanding of the Stipulation and his agreement to be bound
by it in open court.
Additionally, the Court further finds that plaintiff's claims
that the Court is so biased towards to individuals representing
themselves pro se as to be coercive toward those individuals to be
unfounded and unsubstantiated.

Instead, the Court often attempts

to take precautions that individuals representing themselves pro se
are not jeopardizing their legal rights and interests.

The Court

finds it disturbing that plaintiff would make such allegations in
an attempt to circumvent agreements he freely entered into and that
he is now unhappy with.
Therefore, the court finds that the present arrangements
between

the

Stipulation

parties
filed

concerning

with

the

the

Court

issues
on

resolved

October

9,

in

the

1992

and

incorporated into the Decree Of Divorce and Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law should continue and plaintiff's Motion For A
Change Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For
A Hearing is denied.

Accordingly, the parties have ten (10) days from the date of
this ruling to file a specific written objection with the clerk of
the court. Regardless as to whether an objection is filed, counsel
for the defendant is directed to prepare an appropriate order

consistent with the aforementioned recommendation.
DATED at Provo, Utah this

T7

day of December, 1992.

RECOMMENDED BY:

cc:

Robert H. Peterson
Marilyn Moody Brown
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT T. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 924400839
vs.
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.

The Court has received two requests from the plaintiff both of which plaintiff has
entitled, "Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order." The Court is not
certain what he intends by such requests. However, treating them as motions for relief from
the stipulation and decree entered in this case, the Court finds no justification for granting
such relief. The Court has now ruled on all issues in this case. Plaintiffs present requests
raise no issues that the Court has not already duly considered and disposed of. Accordingly,
defendants requests are denied.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to the Court for signature. This
memorandum decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.
A

O /

cc:

Marylin Moody Brown, Esq.
Robert H. Peterson

OQP;

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT T. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 924400839
vs.
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.

Having received and fully considered plaintiff's Objection to the ruling of the
Commissioner, dated December 7, 1992, the Court hereby overrules the objection. The
Court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish that he signed the stipulation upon which the
Commissioner's ruling was based as a result of fraud and coercion. Although the Court
understands that plaintiff is not now, nor perhaps ever was, happy with the terms of the
stipulation, plaintiff's representations are simply insufficient to overcome the presumption
that plaintiff voluntarily entered into the stipulation by signing his name to an agreement
which contained several affirmations that he was doing so of his own free will and choice,
and without coercion. Because plaintiff has not claimed that the commissioner ruling is in
any way inconsistent with the stipulation entered into by the parties, the Court must uphold
the Decree of Divorce entered in this case and enforce the parties' stipulation according to its

terms.
Furthermore, plaintiffs "Motion for Change of Venue" is inappropriate and hereby
denied.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 13th day of January, 1993.

cc:

Marylin Moody Brown, Esq.
Robert H. Peterson
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Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR A HEARING
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ORDER

ROBERT T. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,

Civil No. 924400839

Defendant.
The Court having received two requests from the Plaintiff both of which Plaintiff has
entitled, "Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order." The Court is not certain
what he intends by such requests. However, treating them as motions for relief from the
stipulation and decree entered in this case, the Court finds no justification for granting such
relief. The Court has now ruled on all issues in this case. Plaintiffs present requests raise no

1

issues that the Court has not already duly considered and disposed of. Defendants requests are
denied.
DATED this 3_

day of f ^ ^ r ^ ^

1993.
BY THE COUJ

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
TO: ROBERT T. PETERSON
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the
above and foregoing Order on Request for Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order to the
Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from
the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to
that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah.
$
davof'TYUoU
DATED this <^_
day
of'tYUai-

,1993.

MARILYN MOODY BROWN
Attorney for Defendant
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Springville, Utah 84663
(801) 225-8000 ext. 550 or 519
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,
Civil No. 924400839
Judge Harding

Defendant.

COMES NOW the plaintiff/appellant, Robert H. Peterson, pro se,
and hereby gives notice of appeal of the Order of the Honorable
Raymond M. Harding dated

\ur*j

^

/ ^9 3

•

This appeal is taken from the Fourth Judicial District Court
in and for Utah County, State of Utah.

This appeal is taken to the

Utah Court of Appeals.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED this 3D

day

of June, 1993

(OBERT H. PETERSON
Appearing Pro Se

